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Abstract
An agent is asked to assess a real-valued variable Yp based on cer-
tain characteristics Xp =( X1
p,...,Xm
p ), and on a database consisting
(X1
i ,...,Xm
i ,Y i) for i =1 ,...,n. A possible approach to combine past
observations of X and Y with the current values of X to generate an
assessment of Y is similarity-weighted averaging. It suggests that the
predicted value of Y , ¯ Y s
p , be the weighted average of all previously
observed values Yi,w h e r et h ew e i g h to fYi,f o re v e r yi =1 ,...,n,i s
the similarity between the vector X1
p,...,Xm
p , associated with Yp,a n d
the previously observed vector, X1
i ,...,Xm
i . We axiomatize this rule.
We assume that, given every database, a predictor has a ranking over
possible values, and we show that certain reasonable conditions on
these rankings imply that they are determined by the proximity to
a similarity-weighted average for a certain similarity function. The
axiomatization does not suggest a particular similarity function, or
even a particular functional form of this function. We therefore pro-
ceed to suggest that the similarity function be estimated from past
observations. We develop tools of statistical inference for parametric
estimation of the similarity function, for the case of a continuous as
well as a discrete variable. Finally, we discuss the relationship of the
proposed method to other methods of estimation and prediction.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Economic agents as well as various professionals are often required to assess
the value of a certain numerical variable. In many situations, available data
are relevant for the assessment problem, but they do not suggest a value
that is indisputably the only reasonable assessment to make. Consider the
following examples.
1. A home owner considers selling her house, and she wonders how much
she could get for it. Naturally, she should be basing her assessment on the
prices at which other houses were sold. Yet, every house has its idiosyncratic
characteristics. Hence the "market value" of her house is a variable that
needs to be assessed based on observations of other transactions, but cannot
be uniquely determined by these transactions in the same way that the price
of a ton of wheat can.
2. An art dealer wants to sell a painting by a reasonably famous painter.
Evidently, the market price of the painting is related to the prices at which
other, similar paintings were sold. Yet, the painting is unique, and its price
may diﬀer from the prices of all other paintings, as well as from their average.
3. An analyst is asked to predict the rate of inﬂation for the coming year.
Using past empirical frequencies of various inﬂation rates is hardly an option
in this case, since every year diﬀers from past years in several ways. Yet, it
is obvious that past inﬂation rates are informative and should somehow be
used for the prediction.1
4. The same analyst is now asked to assess the probability of a stock
market crash within the next six months. Again, she is expected to gener-
ate an assessment that is based on past observations. However, every two
situations would typically diﬀer in the values of certain important economic
variables.
1This application was suggested by Raul Drachman.
25. A physician is asked to assess the probability of success of an operation
to be performed on a certain patient. Past experience with other patients is
clearly relevant and should inform the assessment process. Yet, every human
body is unique, and simple relative frequencies of success do not summarize
all the relevant information.
6. A lawyer is asked by her client what are the chances of winning a
case. Clearly, every case is idiosyncratic. Yet, the rulings in similar cases
and under like-minded judges are relevant for the assessment.
In all of these problems one attempts to assess the value of a variable
Yp based on the values of relevant variables, Xp =( X1
p,...,Xm
p ),a n do na
database consisting of the variables (X1
i ,...,Xm
i ,Y i) for i =1 ,...,n.T h e
question is, how do and how should people combine past observations of X
and Y with the current values of X to generate an assessment of Y ?
This problem is extensively studied in statistics, machine learning, and
related ﬁelds. Among the numerous methodologies that have been sug-
gested and used to solve such problems one may mention parametric and
non-parametric regression, neural nets, linear and non-linear classiﬁers, k-
nearest neighbor approaches (Fix and Hodges (1951, 1952), Cover and Hart
(1967), Devroye, Gyorﬁ, and Lugosi (1996)), kernel-based estimation (Akaike
(1954), Rosenblatt (1956), Parzen (1962), Silverman (1986), Scott (1992)),
and others. Each of these methodologies has considerable success in a va-
riety of applications. Moreover, each methodology can also be viewed as a
tentative model of human reasoning. How should we choose among these
approaches for descriptive and for normative applications?
Our approach to this problem is axiomatic and empirical. We start with
a system of axioms that characterizes a class of assessment rules. We do not
expect the axiomatic approach, or other theoretical considerations to fully
specify the parameters of the assessment rule. Rather, we suggest that these
parameters be estimated from data. This estimation is done in the context of
a probability model that allows statistical inference. We now turn to describe
3this approach in more detail.
1.2 Axiomatization of Similarity-Weighted Averaging
For the axiomatic model we assume that, given a database B =( Xi,Y i)i≤n,
where n ∈ N, Xi ∈ Rm,a n dYi ∈ R,a n dan e wd a t ap o i n tXp ∈ Rm,t h e
agent has a ranking %B,Xp over the possible values of Yp. The interpretation
of ξ %B,Xp ζ is that, given the database B and the new data point Xp,
ξ is more likely to be observed than is ζ. W es t u d yt h er a n k i n g s%B,Xp
that the agent would generate given various possible databases, holding m
ﬁxed. We formulate axioms on such rankings, and show that the rankings
satisfy these axioms if and only if they can be represented by similarity-
weighted averaging. Speciﬁcally, the axioms are equivalent to the existence
of a function s : Rm×Rm → R++ such that, given a database B =( Xi,Y i)i≤n
and a new data point Xp =( X1
p,...,Xm
p ) ∈ Rm, two possible estimates of Yp
are ranked according to their proximity to the similarity-weighted average of





i≤n s(Xi,X p)Yi P
i≤n s(Xi,X p)
(1)
This rule for generating predictions is reminiscent of kernel estimation. (See
Akaike (1954), Rosenblatt (1956), and Parzen (1962). See details in sub-
section 2 below.). We prefer the term "similarity" since it suggests a cognitive
interpretation of the function, as opposed to the more technical "kernel".
This is obviously only a matter of interpretation.2
The axioms we propose are not universal and they need not be satisﬁed
by all types of human reasoning. Speciﬁcally, when people use the data to
develop theories, and then use these theories to generate predictions, they are
2Our axiomatization relies on that of Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001, 2003). Yet, the
former is not a special case of the latter. Moreover, the analysis conducted here employs
t h ef a c tt h a tt h ev a r i a b l eY is real-valued.
4unlikely to satisfy our axioms, or to follow (1). (We elaborate on this point
after the presentation of the axioms in Section 3.) Our axioms attempt to
describe the assessment of an agent who aggregates data, but who does not
engage in theorizing. When agents do reason by general rules, or theories, a
model such as regression analysis may be a better model than the similarity-
weighted averaging we discuss here.
We also axiomatize the relation "more likely than" that corresponds to a
set of agents, constituting a "market", and we show that, under our axioms,
one may replace all agents with their subjective similarity functions by a
"representative" agent with an appropriately deﬁned similarity function.
1.3 The Empirical Similarity
The axiomatization we propose does not specify a particular similarity func-
tion, or even a particular functional form thereof.3 Where do the similarity
n u m b e r sc o m ef r o m ?I nt h i sp a p e rw ed on o ta t t e m p tt op r o v i d eat h e o r e t i c a l
answer to this question. Rather, we suggest an empirical approach: given a
database B =( Xi,Y i)i≤n, we assume that past values Yi were also generated








relative to the similarity function s of the representative agent. We then ask
which similarity function s : Rm ×Rm → R++ can best ﬁt the data B under
this assumption. This function, dubbed the empirical similarity,c a nt h e nb e
used to generate assessments of Y
s
p. In this paper we address a parametric
version of this question. We suggests a functional form of s, and estimate
its parameters by maximum likelihood estimator in a statistical model that
3Billot, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (2004) oﬀer an axiomatization of a particular functional
form of a similarity function. Assuming that an agent employs a similarity-weighted
averaging as suggested here, they impose additional axioms on the agent’s assessments
given various databases and various new data points, which are equivalent to the existence
of a norm on Rm such that the similarity function is a negative exponent of this norm.
5we deﬁne shortly. However, an "empirical similarity function" may be any
function that is estimated from the data, or that is chosen to ﬁtt h ed a t a
according to equation (2).
Further discussion of our estimation methodology and the assumptions
underlying it is deferred to sub-section 6.2. We now proceed to describe a
statistical model within which this estimation can be analyzed.
1.4 Statistical Analysis
The empirical similarity we obtain can be viewed as a point estimate of a
similarity function, if we embed equation 1 in a statistical model. Speciﬁcally,




j≤m wj(xj − x0
j)2
such as sw = e−dw or sw = 1
1+dw. Observe that the weights (wj)j are not
restricted to sum to 1. This allows some ﬂexibility in the relative weight of
closer versus more remote observations. For instance, multiplying all weights
(wj)j by a constant λ
2 > 0 is tantamount to multiplying dw by λ>0.I f
λ>1, this transformation reduces the relative impact of remote points.









i.i.d. ∼ N(0,σ 2).
In such a model it makes sense to ask whether the point estimates of the
unknown parameters are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from a pre-speciﬁed value,
and in particular, from zero. In this paper we focus on maximum likelihood
estimation of the parameters (wj)j, and we develop tests for such hypotheses.
6For some applications, including examples 5 and 6 above, the observed
values of Yt are categorical. In this case one cannot assume a model such as
(3), and the latter should be replaced with a model of the form
P (Yt =1|X1,Y 1,...,Xt−1,Y t−1)=F (Y s
t )
where F is a cumulative distribution function, and Xi is an m-vector. This
model diﬀers from discrete choice models in a way that parallels the diﬀerence
between our model for a continuous Y s
t and linear regression. Speciﬁcally,
the probability that Yt assumes the value 1 depends on the weighted relative
frequency of 1 among past values {Yi}i<t, where the weight of the value Yi
depends on the similarity between the vector Xi observed in the past and
the current observation Xt. We provide a statistical model for this case, and
develop tests for hypotheses about the values of the parameters (wj)j in this
model as well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2we discuss the
relationship between our methodology and existing statistical methodologies.
Section 3 provides the axiomatization of similarity-weighted averaging, for a
single agent and for a set of agents. In Section 4 we develop the statistical
theory for the continuous case, whereas Section 5 deals with the discrete case.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Techniques
Our main focus is on human reasoning. We are interested in data that are
generated by people, and we take the similarity-weighted average as a possible
model of how people generate assessments. That is, we interpret our model
as describing a causal relationship.
Our methodology can be applied also to databases in which the vari-
able Y is not a result of human reasoning. In this case our model should
not be interpreted causally, but one may still ﬁnd a similarity function that
7best ﬁts the data. Moreover, one may even conduct hypotheses tests for the
parameters of the similarity function, to the extent that one believes that
the data generating process may be in agreement with one of the models
speciﬁed above. In other words, the empirical approach suggested here, cou-
pled with the statistical inference that accompanies it, may be viewed as a
general-purpose statistical technique dealing with the prediction of a variable
Y based on variables X1,...,Xm and past observations of all these variables
in conjunction.
Viewed from this perspective, one might wonder how our prediction tech-
nique compares with established ones, such as regression analysis. An obvious
weakness of our approach is that it does not attempt to identify trends. For
instance, assume that there exists a single variable X which denotes time,
and that the data lie on a line Y = X.T h i so b v i o u st r e n dw i l ln o tb er e c o g -
nized by our technique, which will continue to expect the next value of Y
to be a weighted average of past values of Y . The prediction technique we
suggest makes sense especially when one might believe that past observations
were obtained under similar circumstances.
2.1 Non-Linear Regression
Our approach diﬀers from non-linear regression in that we do not assume
that the data generating process follows a basic functional relationship of the
form Y = f(X1,...,Xm). Rather, we assume that Y is distributed around a
weighted average of its past values, where the X’s determine these weights.
If, however, one does assume that there exists an underlying functional
relationship Y = f(X1,...,Xm), our technique may still be used for predic-
tion of Y .A s l o n g a s f is suﬃciently smooth, one may hope that, with a
large number of observations that are evenly scattered in terms of their X
values, the similarity-weighted averaging will result in reasonable predictions.
Indeed, the similarity-weighted average is reminiscent of Nadaraya-Watson’s
estimator of a non-parametric functional relationship. Observe that, as op-
8posed to Nadaraya-Watson’s technique and related literature, we do not at-
tempt to ﬁnd an optimal kernel function based on theoretical considerations,
but ﬁnd the kernel/similarity function that best ﬁts the data.
Observe that our estimation of the similarity function s is parametric.
This does not imply that we restrict the function f to a parametrized family
of functions, should a relationship Y = f(X1,...,Xm) actually exist. Any
function s may be used to generate predictions in a non-parametric prob-
lem. To simplify our estimation problem, we restrict attention to functions
s within a parametrized family of similarity functions. Thus, we try to para-
metrically estimate how to best perform non-parametric estimation.
2.2 Kernel Estimation and Case-Based Reasoning
If we think of similarity-weighted averaging as a model of human reasoning,
we ﬁnd that a case-based reasoner, as modeled by this formula, can be viewed
a ss o m e o n ew h ob e l i e v e si nag e n e r a lr u l eo ft h ef o r mY = f(X1,...,Xm) but
does not know the functional form of f and therefore attempts to estimate
it by non-parametric techniques.
The notion that people reason by analogies dates back to Hume (1748) at
the latest. In artiﬁcial intelligence, this idea was reincarnated as case-based
reasoning by Schank (1986) and Schank and Riesbeck (1989). Inspired by
this work, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001, 2003) developed a formal,
axiomatically-based theory of decision and prediction by analogies. In this
literature it has been mentioned that case-based reasoning is a natural and
ﬂexible mode of thinking and decision making. Our statistical approach
strengthens this intuition by pointing out that case-based reasoning may be
a way to estimate a functional rule.
Taking an evolutionary viewpoint, assume that nature programs the mind
of an organism who needs to operate in an unknown environment. The organ-
ism will need to learn certain functional rules of the form Y = f(X1,...,Xm),
but it is not yet known what form the function f m i g h tt a k e .T h es t a t i s t i c a l
9viewpoint suggest case-based assessment by similarity-weighted averaging as
a procedure to predict Y , which may perform well in a variety of possible
environments f. Moreover, it turns out that the similarity-weighted aver-
aging does not explicitly resort to general rules and theories, and thus does
not require abstract thinking. Case-based reasoning therefore appears to be
a ﬂexible methodology of learning rules, which can be implemented on sim-
ple machines. Admittedly, this methodology is limited and human reasoning
requires also abstract thinking and the development of explicit general theo-
ries. Yet, the evolutionary viewpoint seems to support case-based reasoning
as a simple but powerful technique.
2.3 Interpolation
Our prediction methodology can also be viewed as a type of interpolation.
Consider ﬁrst the case m =1 ,t h a ti s ,as i n g l ev a r i a b l eX.E v e r y p a s t
case is a point (xi,y i) ∈ R2, and we are asked to assess the value of Y
for a new point xp ∈ R. Assume for simplicity that xp is in the interval
[mini xi,maxi xi]. Linear interpolation would generate a prediction by the
line segment connecting (xi,y i) and (xk,y k) for the two values xi and xk that
are closest to xp in either direction. This approach may be a bit extreme
since it uses only the y values for the closest x’s. In this respect, it is similar
to a (single) nearest neighbor technique. Other types of interpolation, such
as polynomial interpolation, would take into account also other points (xl,y l)
for xl that is not necessarily the closest to xp on either side.
These interpolation techniques implicitly assume that the values observed
are the actual, precise values of an unknown function. If, however, we recog-
nize that there is some inherent randomness in the process, that we may not
measure certain hidden variables, or that there are measurement errors, we
m i g h to p tf o rat e c h n i q u et h a ti sl e s ss e n s i t i v et oe a c hp a r t i c u l a rv a l u eo f
Y . Following this line of thought, our approach can be viewed as perform-
ing statistical interpolation: every observation is used in the interpolation
10process, where closer points have a higher impact on the predicted value.
As opposed to interpolation by high-order polynomials, when many points
have been observed, no particular point would have a large impact on the
predicted value.
When we consider the case m>1, generalizing this interpolation tech-
nique requires a multi-dimensional distance function. Our methodology might
therefore be conceptualized as a multi-dimensional statistical interpolation
technique, where the distance function is empirically learnt.
2.4 Bayesian Updating
A special case of the formula (1) is when s is constant (say, s ≡ 1), and the
formula boils down to the simple average (of Y ) over the entire database.
This could be viewed as an estimator of the unconditional expectation of Y ,
having not observed any X’s.
By contrast, one may consider an extreme similarity function given by
s(Xi,X p)=1 {Xi=Xp}. That is, two data points are considered to be perfectly
similar if they have exactly the same X values, and absolutely dissimilar
otherwise.4 In this case, the formula (1) yields the average of Y over the
sub-database deﬁned by the values Xp,a n di tc a nb ev i e w e da sa ne s t i m a t e
of the conditional expectation of Y , given Xp.
Thus, the formula (1) provides a continuum between conditional and
unconditional expectations. When s(Xi,X p)=1 {Xi=Xp}, the reasoner only
considers identical cases as relevant, and all of them are then deemed equally
relevant. By contrast, if s ≡ 1, the reasoner considers all cases as identically
relevant. In between, (1) allows for various cases to have a varying degree of
relevance. Given the new datapoint Xp, past points Xi are judged for their
relevance, but not in a dichotomous way. In other words, Bayesian updating
may be viewed as a special case of (1), where similarity is evaluated in a
4In our model the similarity function is positive everywhere. This simpliﬁes the formula
and the axiomatization alike. But one can extend the model to include similarity functions
that may vanish, or consider zero similarity values as a limit case.
11binary way: two observations are similar if and only if they are identical in
every possible known aspect.
As compared to Bayesian updating, a reasoners who employs (1) might
be viewed as a less extreme assessor of similarity. She does not use only the
observations with identical X values, but also other, less relevant ones. Why
would she do that? Why should she contaminate her assessment of Y for Xp
with Y that were observed for other X’s?
The answer is, presumably, the scarcity of data. If we are faced with
a database in which the very same Xp values appear a very large number
of times, it would seem reasonable to assess the conditional expectation of
Y given Xp based solely on the observations that share the exact values of
Xp.B u t o n e m a y ﬁnd that these exact values were encountered very few
times, if at all. Indeed, the X’s might include certain variables, such as
time and location, that uniquely identify the observation. In this case, no
t w oo b s e r v a t i o n se v e r ys h a r et h ee x a c tX values, and conditioning on Xp
leaves one with an empty sub-database. Even in less extreme examples, the
resulting sub-database may be too meager for generating predictions. In
those cases, the formula (1) oﬀers an alternative, in which the similarity of
the observations is traded oﬀ for the size of the database.
Viewed thus, the formula (1) may deserve the title "kernel updating".
As in other kernel-based techniques, the relevance of an observation (Xi,Y i)
is not restricted to identical datapoints Xp = Xi, but is extended to other
datapoints Xp, to an extent determined by the kernel values s(Xi,X p).T h e
use of a kernel function in this case is justiﬁed by the paucity of the data, that
is, by the fact that observations with precisely the same Xp are scarce. This
parallels the motivation for the use of kernel functions in kernel estimation
of a density function and in kernel classiﬁcation.
Finally, we observe that the use of observations (Xi,Y i) where Xi 6= Xp for
the prediction of Yp may also follow from Bayesian updating if one assumes
12that the X variables are observed with noise.5
2.5 Auto-Regression Models
From a mathematical viewpoint, the similarity-weighted average can be re-
garded as a type of an auto-regression model. In auto-regression models, as
well as in our case, Yt is distributed around a linear function of past values of
Y . Yet, the similarity-weighted average formula diﬀers from auto-regression
models in several important ways. Mathematically, the weights that past
values {Yi}i<t have in the equation of Yt do not depend on the time diﬀer-
ence (t − i), but on the similarity of the corresponding X values, that is on
s(Xi,X t). In particular, observe that the weights of {Yi}i<t in the determi-
nation of the expectation of Yt are not known before time t, because these
weights depend on Xt. Observe also that in our case each Yt depends on
all past observations. Thus, our model is an auto-regression model whose
order is not bounded a-priori. Another important diﬀerence is that in our
case the index t has no cardinal signiﬁcance. We use it only to order the
data, but our procedure does not rely on the fact that the time diﬀerence
between observations t − 1 and t i st h es a m ea st h et i m ed i ﬀerence between
observations t − 2 and t − 1.6
Conceptually, our model assumes that similar situations in the past might
have a signiﬁcant impact on current values of Y ,e v e ni ft h e yo c c u r r e da
long time ago. When one discusses natural phenomena, such as population
growth, one expects the weight of past observations to be increasing as a
function of their recency. But when we deal with human reasoning, as in the
case of inﬂationary expectations, less recent, but more similar situations in
the past may have a greater impact on the future than would more recent
but less similar situations. In a sense, human memory may serve as a channel
5This comment is due to Mark Machina.
6In fact, our procedure can be easily adapted to the case in which observations are only
partially ordered. As we brieﬂym e n t i o nb e l o w ,ad i ﬀerent variant of out model can deal
with situations in which the observations that are not ordered at all.
13through which past periods can aﬀect future periods without the mediation
of the periods in between.
The above need not imply that our model ignores time completely. One
may introduce time as one of the variables Xj. This would allow more recent
periods to have greater impact on the prediction than less recent ones, simply
because the time diﬀerence is translated, via the variable Xj,t oad i s t a n c e
in the X space, and thus to a lower degree of similarity.
2 . 6 H o wt oA n a l y z eT i m eS e r i e s
We conclude that the relationship between our model and auto-regression
models is superﬁcial. Yet, our model can be adapted to deal with time series
in a way that resembles auto-regression in a more profound way. Auto-
regression can be viewed, in bold strokes, as explaining a variable by its own
past values, with statistical techniques such as linear regression. The nat-
ural counterpart in our case would be to predict the variable Y by equation
(1) where the variables (Xj)j include lagged values of Y itself. For exam-
ple, assume that Yt is a quarterly growth rate. Introducing Yt−1,...,Yt−k as
X1
t ,...,Xk
t would suggest that the predicted rate of growth at period t be
a (weighted) average of the rates of growth in similar periods in the past,
where similarity is deﬁned by the pattern of growth rates in the most recent
k periods. Our technique would ﬁnd weights w1,...,wk that best ﬁtt h ed a t a









sw((Yi−k,...,Y i−1),(Yt−k,...,Yt−1)) = e
−√S
j≤k wj(Yi−j−Yt−j)2
This estimation technique could be interpreted as follows. We ﬁrst ask,
what determines the similarity of patterns of growth? That is, is a "pattern"
14deﬁned by the most recent period, or by several most recent periods, how
many of these, and what are the relative weights? The estimation of the
weights wj attempts to answer this question. While the resulting weights
need not be monotonically decreasing in j ( t h et i m ed i ﬀerence), one would
expect that these weights would become small for large values of j.I nf a c t ,i n
determining the number of periods that deﬁne a "pattern", k, one implicitly
assumes that periods more distant than k are not part of the "pattern".
The selection of this k may be compared to the selection of the order p in
auto-regression models of order p (AR(p)).
Once the weights wj have been determined, we search the entire database
for periods i such that the pattern preceding i, (Yi−k,...,Yi−1), resembles the
current pattern, (Yt−k,...,Yt−1). For such periods, the value Yi would have a
higher weight in the prediction of Yt than would the value corresponding to
periods for which (Yl−k,...,Yl−1) resembles (Yt−k,...,Yt−1) to a lesser degree.
Again, one may also add time as an additional variable Xk+1 to make sure
that the prediction discounts the past.
3 Axiomatization
3.1 Single Agent
The axiomatization does not require that past data points range over all of
Rm. We assume that they belong to a non-empty subset Γ ⊂ Rm.H o w e v e r ,
we do assume that every possible data point in Γ may have been observed
together with every value y ∈ R any ﬁnite number of times. We therefore
model the database as a vector of counters, denoted I, rather than the set of
observations B used in the introduction.
Speciﬁcally, let C = Γ × R denote case types. A case type (x,ξ) ∈ C is
interpreted as an observation of a data point x ∈ Γ coupled with the value
ξ ∈ R. Memory i san o n - z e r of u n c t i o nI : C → Z+ such that
P
c∈C I(c) < ∞,
specifying for every case type c how many cases of that type have appeared.
15Let I be the set of all memories.
We are currently presented with a new data point xp ∈ Γ.T h e t a s k i s
to estimate the value η ∈ R that corresponds to xp. We assume that the
predictor does not only choose one such η, but has a likelihood ranking over
all possible predictions. Formally, for I ∈ I,l e t%I⊂ R × R be a binary
relation over the reals. For ξ,η ∈ R, ξ %I η is interpreted as “Given memory
I, ξ is a more likely value for the variable Y at the new data point xp than
is η”. Observe that in the formal notation we suppress xp. This new data
point is ﬁxed throughout this section.
We now state axioms on {%I}I∈I.T h eﬁrst three are identical to those
appearing in Gilboa-Schmeidler (2001, 2003).
A1 Order: For every I ∈ I, %I is complete and transitive on R.
A2 Combination: For every I,J ∈ I and every ξ,η ∈ R,i fξ %I η (ξ ÂI η)
and ξ %J η,t h e nξ %I+J η (ξ ÂI+J η).
A3 Archimedean Axiom: For every I,J ∈ I and every ξ,η ∈ R,i fξ ÂI η,
then there exists l ∈ N such that ξ ÂlI+J η.
Observe that in the presence of Axiom 2, Axiom 3 also implies that for
every I,J ∈ I and every ξ,η ∈ R,i fξ ÂI η,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t sl ∈ N such
that for all k ≥ l, ξ ÂkI+J η.
Axiom A1 is rather standard. It requires that, given any memory, the
"more likely than" relation be a weak order.
Axiom A2 is the main axiom of Gilboa-Schmeidler (1997, 2001, and 2003).
Roughly, it states that, if ξ is more likely than η g i v e ne a c ho ft w om e m o r i e s ,
then ξ should also be more likely than η given their union. This axiom
is satisﬁed by a variety of statistical techniques, such as kernel estimation,
kernel classiﬁcation, and maximum likelihood rankings. Yet, it is by no means
universal, and it should not be expected to hold in several important classes of
problems. If the union of memories results in new insights, or if the similarity
function is being learnt by the predictor while she produces predictions, then
the combination axiom should not be expected to hold. Similarly, if the
16estimator uses both inductive and deductive reasoning, she may well violate
this axiom. However, A2 appears reasonable as a requirement on simple
aggregation of evidence.
A3 states that, if memory I contains evidence that ξ is more likely than
η, then, for each other memory J there exists a large enough number, l,s u c h
that l repetitions of I would be suﬃcient to overwhelm the evidence provided
by J, and suggest that ξ is more likely than η also given the union of J and
l times I. Thus A3 precludes the possibility that one piece of evidence is
inﬁnitely more weighty than another.
Gilboa-Schmeidler (1997, 2001, and 2003) also use a diversity axiom,
which we do not use here. Instead, we impose a new axiom that is speciﬁc
to our set-up. It states that, if memory I consists solely of cases that relate
t ot h es a m ed a t ap o i n tx, then the ranking %I is consistent with simple
averaging. Observe that for such databases there is nothing to be learnt
from the values of x since they do not change at all. In this case, it makes
sense that the most likely value of y be the average of its observed values, and
that possible values be ranked according to their proximity to this average.
For x ∈ Γ,d e ﬁne Ix to be the set of memories in which only data point
x has been observed. Formally, Ix = {I ∈ I|I((x0,y)) = 0 for x0 6= x}.F o r






The last axiom we employ is:
A4 Averaging: For every x ∈ Γ,e v e r yI ∈ Ix, and every ξ,η ∈ R,
ξ %I η iﬀ |ξ − yI | ≤ |η − yI |.
Our result can now be stated:
Theorem 1 Let there be given Γ,a n d{%I}I∈I. Then the following two
statements are equivalent:
(i) {%I}I∈I satisfy A1-A4;





for every I ∈ I and every ξ,η ∈ R,






Furthermore, in this case the function s is unique up to multiplication by
a positive number.
3.2 Discussion
The theorem states that, if we rank possible predictions of Y by their prox-
imity to the average of past values of Y whenever the values of X1,...,Xm
are ﬁxed, and we wish to extend it to general databases in a way that satis-
ﬁes our axioms (notably, the combination axiom), we are bound to do it by
proximity to weighted averages.
The axiomatization we provide can be interpreted descriptively or nor-
matively. From a descriptive point of view, the theorem suggests that, if
an agent’s rankings of possible value of a variable y given various databases
satisfy our axioms, she can be ascribed a similarity function s such that
her rankings are determined by proximity to a similarity-weighted average
of past values of y, calculated by the similarity function s.> F r o m a n o r -
mative viewpoint, the axiomatization might be used to convince an agent
that similarity-weighted averaging is a reasonable way to assess the variable
y given a database of past observations. Finally, the axiomatization also sug-
gests a deﬁnition of an agent’s similarity function, and method of elicitation
for it.
A weighted averaging formula is also axiomatized in Billot, Gilboa, Samet,
and Schmeidler (2003). In their model a reasoner is asked to name a prob-
ability vector based on a memory I. Billot et al. impose an appropriate
version of the combination axiom to conclude that the probability vector
given a memory I is the weighted average of the vectors induced by each
18case separately. Unfortunately, the result of Billot et al. only applies if there
are at least 3 states of the world, that is, if the probability vector has at least
two degrees of freedom. For the special case of a single-dimension probabil-
ity simplex, their theorem does not hold. In this sense, the present paper
complements Billot et al. (2003).
3.3 Representative Agent
The theorem above shows under what conditions an agent’s "more likely
than" relation will follow the similarity-weighted average formula for an ap-
propriately chosen similarity function. It relates the theoretical concept of
"similarity" to the relation "more likely than", which is assumed to be ob-
servable.
In practice, however, one can often observe only aggregate data. For in-
stance, one may observe market prices of houses or paintings, but not the
assessments of these prices by agents. What properties should such assess-
ments satisfy? How are individual assessments aggregated over agents? Can
such aggregates also be described as similarity-weighted averages?
To answer these questions, we extend the model presented above to in-
corporate more than one agent. Speciﬁcally, let P = {1,...,p} be a set of
agents, and re-deﬁn et h ec a s et y p e st ob eC = P × Γ × R.C a s e o f t y p e
(i,x,y) is interpreted as "agent i ∈ P has observed a data point x ∈ Γ and
a corresponding value of y ∈ R". Thus, every observation in this model
speciﬁes the observer, and not only the observed.
We continue as before to deﬁne memory as a non-zero vector I : C → Z+
such that
P
c∈C I(c) < ∞.L e tI be the set of all memories. We now think
of memory I is a matrix of counters, specifying how many times each agent
has observed any possible (x,y) ∈ Γ × R combination.
The relation %I is interpreted as follows. For ξ,η ∈ R, ξ %I η means that,
if I speciﬁes how many times each agent has seen each pair (x,y),t h e nξ is
more likely than η to be the assessment of the set of agents. This assessment
19is supposed to reﬂect some collective opinion, and it does not reﬂect economic
power or strategic considerations. If, for instance, we discuss the value of a
painting by van Gogh, every agent is expected to have some assessment of
the value of the painting, regardless of their ability or willingness to pay for
it.
The axioms we use are the same axioms verbatim. The logic behind
the axioms mirrors that of the single agent case, though, naturally, in the
multi-agent case the axioms are more demanding.
We ﬁrst state the theorem as applied to this case:
Corollary 2 Let there be given P,Γ,a n d{%I}I∈I. Then the following two
statements are equivalent:
(i) {%I}I∈I satisfy A1-A4;





for every I ∈ I and every ξ,η ∈ R,






Furthermore, in this case the functions {si}i∈P a r eu n i q u eu pt oj o i n tm u l -
tiplication by a positive number.
We wish to show that, if we assume that all information is shared, then a
set of agents P, characterized by functions {si}i∈P, is indistinguishable from
a representative agent whose similarity function is the average of {si}i∈P.T o
this end, deﬁne Ish as the set of memories in which all agents have the same
information, that is: Ish = {I ∈ I|I((i,x,y)) = I((i0,x,y)) for all i,i0 ∈ P }.
We now have
Corollary 3 Let there be given P,Γ,a n d{%I}I∈I.A s s u m e t h a t {%I}I∈I





for every I ∈ Ish and every ξ,η ∈ R,






Furthermore, in this case the function s is unique up to multiplication by
a positive number.
Observe that the identiﬁcation of individual similarity functions si re-
quires that memories I/ ∈ Ish be considered, that is, memories in which
diﬀerent agents may have observed diﬀerent cases. Measuring %I for I/ ∈ Ish
and testing our axioms may be done in a controlled experiments in a labora-
tory. It is more challenging to observe %I for I/ ∈ Ish in empirical data. Yet,
one may imagine that such relations exist, and satisfy our axioms.
As long as we restrict attention to shared information, namely, to memo-
ries in Ish, we only observe the average similarity function. Attributing this
average similarity to a representative agent, we conclude that the assessment
made by a set of agents will be equivalent to that made by the representative
agent.
The observability of %I mirrors the observability of a utility function in
economics: in principle, one may measure each agent’s utility function. In
reality, often only aggregate data are available. Under certain conditions,
one may assume that the decisions of a set of agents can be described by
the decision of a single, representative agent. Similarly, in our case one may,
in principle, measure each agent’s similarity function. In practice, we often
observe only aggregate assessments. However, under the conditions speciﬁed
above, we may replace the set of agents by a single, representative agent,
and obtain the same assessment for shared information. It is this similarity
function, of a representative agent, that we attempt to estimate.
214 Statistical Inference for a Continuous Model
4.1 The Model and the Likelihood Function
We now impose the assumption that the similarity function is exponential in
a weighted Euclidean distance. That is, we assume that there are positive






This function is axiomatized in Billot, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (2004).
However, it is used here only as an example, and our analysis can be ex-
tended to any other similarity function that depends on a ﬁnite number of
parameters.
Next we suppose that the data generating process is given by
Yt =
P
i<t sw (xt,x i)Yi P
i<t sw (xt,x i)








Equation (5) can be written in matrix form as
Sy = ε,
where S = S (w) is an n×n lower triangular matrix that does not depend on
the variables Yi (see details in sub-section 4.3 below), y =( Y1,...,Y n)0,a n dε
is an n × 1 vector of i.i.d. Gaussian variables with zero mean and variance






















We use the notation θ =( σ2,w 1,...,w m) for the vector of all unknown
parameters in our model, and observe that θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R
m+1
+ .W e p r o p o s e t o
estimate the weights (wj) by maximum likelihood. Set H = S0S/σ2.I nv i e w









The maximum likelihood estimator of θ is





We now wish to develop a statistical test for the null hypothesis H0 : wj =0 .
Rejecting this hypothesis will imply that the variable Xj is signiﬁcant in the
determination of Y , in the sense that the distance function, according to




















































































































To conduct a hypothesis test of the form
H0 : θr =0vs. H1 : θr > 0, for r =2 ,...,m+1







































We reject H0 when t is large (e.g., when it exceeds 1.645, if a 5% signiﬁcance
level is desired).
For multiple linear hypotheses of the form
H0 : Rθ = r vs. H1 : Rθ 6= r,
24where R is a q×(m+1)matrix consisting of q ≤ (m +1 )independent linear
hypotheses, we can use the Wald test, given by
W =
³










Rˆ θ − r
´
.
The statistic is distributed χ2 (q) under H0. We reject H0 when W is large.
4.3 Calculations
The analysis in the previous sub-sections does not depend on the functional
form of the function s. In this sub-section we calculate ˙ Hr for the case of an
exponential function of the weighted Euclidean distance.












and let 1 be an n×1 vector of 10s,a n dej — the canonical vector of 0’s apart


















It is easily seen that
S (w)=I − BwAw,
where I is the identity matrix of order n.S o ,
H (w)=
(I − BwAw)




























































for r =2 ,...,m +1
5 S t a t i s t i c a lI n f e r e n c ef o rt h eD i s c r e t eC a s e
5.1 The Model and the Likelihood Function
We now deal with the case in which each Yt is categorical. In particular,
consider examples 5 and 6 above, in which an expert is asked to estimate
the probability of a certain event, and the observed values of Y can only be
{0,1}. In these examples the assessed values can be anywhere in the interval





i≤n sw(Xi,X p)Yi P
i≤n sw(Xi,X p)
may generate any value in [0,1]. But in this case one cannot assume that
previously observed values of Y were generated by a Normal distribution
26centered around a similarity-weighted average such as Y
s
p,a si nm o d e l( 5 )
above.7
We therefore assume the following model8
P (Yt =1 |Ft−1)=Ft (zt (w)),t =1 ,...,n, (9)
where Ft is a continuous conditional distribution function with density ft,
Ft−1 = σ(Yt−1,...,Y 1) and
zt =
P
i<t sw (Xt,X i)Yi P
i<t sw (Xt,X i)
. (10)
In this setting the x’s are taken to be ﬁxed. Letting Ft be the standard normal
cumulative distribution function (cdf) leads to a probit type model whereas
letting Ft be the logistic distribution leads to a logit type model. Since
zt ∈ [0,1], it might be sensible to let Ft be a beta distribution. Note that
in the classical case, corresponding to the rule based model, it is postulated
that P (Yt =1 |X)=F(Xβ). Unlike our case, no Yj’s appear on the right
hand side and the model (9) is nonlinear through both Ft and zt.
In view of (9) and (10)




i<t sw (Xt,X i)(Yj − Yi)
¡P
i<t sw (Xt,X i)
¢2 ,
which is non-negative if Yj =1and non-positive when Yj =0 . In other words,
when the similarity between Yt and Yj increases, the conditional probability
that Yt =1will not fall when Yj =1and will not rise when Yj =0 .T h e
model thus makes sense at least in this respect.
7Other reasons for which model (5) is inappropriate in this case are that the R2 of
regression (5) would typically be low and that, because of the non-Gaussian nature of the
observations, OLS would be ineﬃcient.
8The categorical variables we discuss here may only assume the values 0 or 1.H o w e v e r ,
the analysis that follows can be extended to the case of a categorical variable assuming
more than two categories.









Yt (1 − Ft (zt))
(1−Yt) .
The log-likelihood is given by
l =l n( L)=
n X
t=1
(Yt ln(Ft(zt)) + (1 − Yt)ln(1− Ft(zt))).







Ft (1 − Ft)





i<t ˙ sw,j (Xt,X i)Yi
¢¡P




i<t ˙ sw,j (Xt,X i)
¢¡P
i<t sw (Xt,X i)Yi
¢
¡P
i<t sw (Xt,X i)
¢2
and ˙ sw,j (Xt,X i) is given in (8).
5.2 Hypothesis Tests

























Ft (1 − Ft)
ftvt,j,k,
f0
t being the derivative of the conditional density with respect to its argument
and vt,j,k = ∂2zt/∂wj∂wk.L e tgt−1 be any function of all information up to
28and including t − 1. Using the law of iterated expectations we get















= E (Ft (1 − Ft)gt−1).
















which does not seem to have a simple closed form. For hypothesis tests of
the form H0 : wj = w0
j, we can either use the observed information (11),
evaluated at estimates, or apply the likelihood ratio test
LRT =2 {l(ˆ w) − l(˜ w)},
where ˆ w, ˜ w are the unrestricted and restricted MLE’s, respectively. The
statistic is distributed χ2 (1) under H0. Given the form of (11),the LRT
seems to be computationally more attractive than the Wald or LM tests,
because the LRT does not use the information matrix whereas the others do.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
6.1 Unordered Data
In the statistical analysis we assumed that each observation Yt is distributed
around a weighted average of past Yi,o rt h a tP(Yt =1 )depends on such a
29weighted average. Such an ordering is necessary for a causal interpretation of
our models. But if we consider a non-causal relationship, one may assume a
model in which the distribution of each Yi conditional on the other variables
{Yk}k6=i is, say, normal around the weighted average of {Yk}k6=i. Indeed, such
a model may be more natural for applications in which the data are not
naturally ordered. For this case, one should adapt the statistical model and
the estimation of the similarity function accordingly.
6.2 Assessments versus Actual Values
The assumptions underlying our estimation process call for elaboration. The
axiomatic model aims to describe how an assessment of Yp, Y
s
p, is generated
based on actually observed values of the variable in question, namely, past
values (Yi)i≤n, such as selling prices of houses or of paintings. Applied to each
past observation Yi, it suggests that the assessment of Yi, Y
s
i, is generated by
(2) for actually observed past values (Yk)k<i. That is, when we explain Yi by
past observations (Yk)k<i,w et r e a tYi as if it were an assessment. When we
explain Yl for l>i ,w et r e a tYi as if it were an actual value. What justiﬁes this
confusion between the actual value of a variable and an assessment thereof?
For many applications of interest the answer lies in the notion of equilib-
rium. If all economic agents agree in their assessment of the price of a house
or a painting, this joint assessment will indeed be its market price. Similarly,
the price of a ﬁnancial asset would equal its own assessment, if all agents
agree on the latter. In these cases, one may assume that, as a feature of
equilibrium, actually observed data coincide with their assessments.9
There may be applications in which one has direct access to, or indirect
measurement of both actual values (Yi) and to their assessments, say (Zi).
In these cases one may ﬁnd the similarity function s that best ﬁts the data
9To a lesser degree, the rate of inﬂation and the probability of a stock market crash















i that are close to (Zi)i,a n d
then use this function to generate an estimate of Zp, Z
s
p,u s i n ga c t u a lv a l u e s
Yk by equation (12) applied to i = p.
Yet another class of applications involves only the assessments (Zi).A s -
sume, for instance, that one only observes asking prices, (Zi), and not ac-
tual selling prices, (Yi). (This is the case in Gayer, Gilboa, and Lieberman
(2004).) If everyone has access only to the asking prices (Zi),o n em a ya p p l y
our axiomatization to these variables, and conclude that the asking price of
a new observation Zp will be a similarity-weighted average of past asking
prices (Zi)i≤n. Moreover, it makes sense to assume that the same similarity
function governed the generation of past values Zi as a function of their past,
(Zk)k<i. Hence one may estimate the similarity function in equation (2) with
Zi instead of Yi, and use the estimated similarity for the prediction of Zp.
Finally, there are situations in which one does not have access to the
assessments (Zi), and in which there is no theoretical reason to assume that
Zi = Yi. In these cases our empirical approach could still be applied. That
is, one may still ask, which function s : Rm × Rm → R++ can best ﬁtt h e
data under the assumption that there were generated by equation (2), and
the function can then be used for prediction of Yp by equation (1). In this
type of application, (Yi) can be viewed as proxies for (Zi). Observe that it
is only in the estimation of s that we replace (Zi) by (Yi).I nt h eg e n e r a t i o n
of the prediction Z
s
p using the estimated s,w eu s et h ea c t u a lv a l u e s(Yi) as
indeed we should.
6.3 Applications
This paper is devoted to the theory of similarity-weighted averaging. This
technique is used in Gayer, Gilboa, and Lieberman (2004) for the assessment
31of real estate prices, as in example 1. Their paper compared this method, rep-
resenting case-based reasoning, to linear regression, representing rule-based
reasoning. Drachman (2004) applies the method developed here to the prob-
lem of inﬂationary expectations.
7 Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
We begin by proving suﬃciency of the axioms (that is, that (i) implies
(ii)), and the uniqueness of the function s.C o n s i d e r a p a i r ξ,η ∈ R.R e -
stricting {%I}I∈I to {ξ,η}, one notices that they satisfy the conditions of
the representation theorem in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001, Theorem 3.1, p.
67, or 2003, Theorem 2, p. 16). Indeed, the ﬁrst three axioms follow directly
from A1-A3, whereas the diversity axiom for two alternatives follows from
the averaging axiom, A4. To apply this theorem we have also to deﬁne the
trivial relation for the memory I =0 : %0= R × R. Hence there exists a
function vξη : Γ×R → R, unique up to multiplication by a positive number,
such that, for every I ∈ I,
ξ %I η iﬀ
P
(x,y)∈C I((x,y))vξη(x,y) ≥ 0.
Next consider a triple {ξ,η,ς} ⊂ R. Restricting {%I}I∈I to {ξ,η,ς} will
no longer satisfy the diversity axiom in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001). This
axiom would state that for every permutation of the triple {ξ,η,ς} there
exists I ∈ I such that ÂI agrees with that permutation. This condition
does not follow from our A4. Indeed, the diversity axiom is too strict for our
purposes. If ξ>η>ς ,t h e nn o%I represented by (∗) will satisfy ξ ÂI ς ÂI η.
However, the proof of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s theorem does not require
the full strength of their diversity axiom. All that is required for three alter-
natives {ξ,η,ς} is that vξη not be a multiple of vης.T ot h i se n d ,i ts u ﬃces that
there be three diﬀerent permutations in {ÂI}I∈I (restricted to {ξ,η,ς}). This
32latter condition is guaranteed by our A4. Speciﬁcally, by the averaging axiom
A4, for every distinct (ξ,η,ς), there exists I ∈ I such that ξ ÂI η,ς. Hence
there are at least three permutations in {ÂI}I∈I (restricted to {ξ,η,ς}), and
the representation theorem for triples holds. Observe also that this argu-
ment does not employ all the relations {%I}I∈I, and it can also be used for
a restricted domain {%I}I∈Ix for any x ∈ Γ.
It follows that, for every triple {ξ,η,ς},o n ec a nﬁnd vξ,vη,v ς : Γ×R → R
such that, for every a,b ∈ {ξ,η,ς},f o re v e r yI ∈ I,







(x,y)∈C I((x,y))[va(x,y) − vb(x,y)] ≥ 0.( B 1 )
In this case, the matrix
¡
vξ,v η,vς¢
is unique up to multiplication by a




Fix x ∈ Γ and consider Ix. Restrict attention to {%I}I∈Ix.S i n c e ( B 1 )
applies to all I ∈ I,i td e ﬁnitely holds for all I ∈ Ix ⊂ I.H o w e v e r , w e




as above. To see this, recall that our derivation of (B1), coupled with the
uniqueness result, holds true for {%I}I∈Ix for any x ∈ Γ.
Observe that the relations {%I}I∈Ix are completely speciﬁed by A4. Specif-
ically, for every a,b ∈ R,f o re v e r yI ∈ Ix,







That is, a %I b iﬀ a is closer to the average yI than is b.C o n s i d e r
fI(α)=
P
(x,y)∈C I((x,y))(α − y)2.
33The function fI(α) is quadratic (in α), and it has a minimum at α = yI.
It follows that for every a,b, for every I ∈ Ix,
fI(a) ≤ fI(b)i ﬀ |a − yI | ≤ |b − yI |.
Combining this fact with the deﬁnition of fI a n dw i t h( B 2 ) ,w ec o n c l u d e
that, for every a,b ∈ {ξ,η,ς} and for every I ∈ Ix,
a %I b iﬀ
P
(x,y)∈C I((x,y))(a − y)2 ≤
P
(x,y)∈C I((x,y))(b − y)2
⇔
P
(x,y)∈C I((x,y))[(a − y)2 − (b − y)2] ≤ 0.( B 3 )
The uniqueness of the representation in (B1) and (B3) imply that there
exists a constant s(x) > 0 such that
va(x,y) − vb(x,y)=−s(x)[(a − y)2 − (b − y)2] (B4)
for every a,b ∈ {ξ,η,ς} and for every y ∈ R. Obviously, once va(x,y),v b(x,y)
are ﬁxed, s(x) is uniquely determined by (B4).
We now turn to discuss various x’s, while still focusing on the triple
{ξ,η,ς}.C o n s i d e r I in I (but not necessarily in Ix for any x). Combine
(B1) and (B4) to conclude that, for a,b ∈ {ξ,η,ς} and for all I ∈ Ix,
a %I b iﬀ
P
(x,y)∈C I((x,y))s(x)(a − y)2 ≤
P
(x,y)∈C I((x,y))s(x)(b − y)2
⇔
P




(x,y)∈C I((x,y))s(x)(α − y)2.
As the function fI above, the function gI(α) is also quadratic (in α), and
it has a minimum at





It follows that for every a,b, for every I ∈ Ix,
gI(a) ≤ gI(b)i ﬀ |a − ys,I | ≤ |b − ys,I |.( B 6 )
Combining (B5) with (B6) we obtain
a %I b iﬀ |a − ys,I| ≤ |b − ys,I|,
that is, {s(x)}x satisﬁes (∗) for the triple {ξ,η,ς}.
Observe that {s(x)}x a r eu n i q u eu pt om u l t i p l i c a t i o nb yap o s i t i v en u m -
ber. In fact, we argue that if s and s0 both satisfy (∗) for particular a,b ∈ R,
a 6= b, then there exists λ>0 such that s0(x)=λs(x) for all x ∈ Γ.I n -
deed, assume that s and s0 both satisfy (∗) for particular a,b.T h i s w o u l d
imply that they both satisfy (B5) for these a,b, and then the uniqueness
of va(x,y) − vb(x,y) in (B1), combined with (B4), implies that there exists
λ>0 such that s0(x)=λs(x) for all x ∈ Γ.
It remains to show that the function s(x) does not depend on the choice
of the triple {ξ,η,ς} ⊂ R. Consider the triple {ξ,η,τ} where τ 6= ς.S i n c e
(B6) applied to ξ and η holds both for the function s of the triple {ξ,η,ς} and
that of the triple {ξ,η,τ}, these two functions have to be positive multiples
of each other. Using this argument inductively implies that all functions s
derived from diﬀerent triples diﬀer only by a constant. Since s can always
be multiplied by a positive constant and still satisfy (∗),o n em a yc h o o s ea n
s of one triple {ξ,η,ς} arbitrarily and use it for all other triples as well.
We need to prove the necessity of the axioms, that is, that (ii) implies
(i). The necessity of A1, A2, and A3 is proved as in Gilboa and Schmeidler
(2001, 2003), whereas the necessity of A4 follows directly from (∗). ¤
Proof of Corollary 2
35This result is a re-writing of Theorem 1 for the special case in which C
is the product of two sets.¤
Proof of Corollary 3
Use Corollary 2 and deﬁne s(x)=1
p
P








(i,x,y)∈C s(x)I((i,x,y)) = ys,I
which concludes the proof.¤
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